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 Bank Relationships and Firm Profitability
Abstract
This paper examines how bank relationships affect firm performance.  An empirical implication
of recent theoretical models is that firms maintaining multiple bank relationships are less
profitable than their single-bank peers.  We investigate this empirical implication using a data set
containing virtually all Norwegian publicly listed firms for the period 1979-1995.  We find that
profitability is substantially higher if firms maintain only a single bank relationship.  We also
find that firms replacing a single bank relationship are on average smaller and younger than
firms not replacing a single bank relationship.
JEL code:  G21, C41
Keywords:  bank relationships, firm profitability.
1 Introduction
Practitioners and business analysts have long recognized the importance of bank
relationships for firms (e.g., Stancill (1980)) and a slate of recent theoretical models have
rekindled academic interest in the topic.  This paper contributes to the growing literature on bank
relationships by empirically examining the link between the firm’s choice of the number of bank
relationships and firm profitability.  We find the theoretical backdrop for pursuing this study in
the literature that focuses on the choice of the number of credit relationships.  In particular, we
emphasize papers by Yosha (1995) and von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998), as far as we are
aware, the only models coupling the firm's choice of the number of creditors to product market
behavior.  An important implication of both models is that, if firms disclose proprietary
information to creditors, firms using bilateral financing achieve higher sales profitability than
those using multilateral financing.
In addition to the choice on the number of bank relationships, we also investigate the
impact of switching bank relationships on firm profitability and the characteristics of firms
replacing a bilateral bank relationship.  von Thadden (1998) shows that in equilibrium, firms
occasionally switch creditors, as an inside bank may try to holdup a borrower.  In his model,
switching firms get, on average, better interest rates than firms of the same quality remaining at
the inside bank.  However, adverse selection occurs such that one implication of his model is
that ‘bad’ firms switch bilateral bank relationships more often than ‘good’ firms do.
To test these implications of recent theoretical models, we study a data set, which
contains bank relationship and firm specific data for most publicly listed Norwegian firms over a
sixteen-year period.  Controlling for firm characteristics such as age, size, debt structure, asset
intangibility, and Tobin’s Q, we find a negative correspondence between the number of bank
relationships and sales profitability.  We also find that firms replacing a single bank relationship
are on average smaller and younger than firms maintaining a single bank relationship throughout
the sample years.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we highlight relevant
theory and recent empirical findings linking the number of bank-firm relationships to firm
profitability.  In particular, we discuss the papers by Yosha (1995) and von Rheinbaben and
Ruckes (1998) in more detail, as we will utilize their intuition throughout ours.  Furthermore, we
explore the paper by von Thadden (1998), and highlight his predictions concerning the
characteristics of firms replacing bilateral bank relationships.  Section 3 contains a description of
the data and the empirical specifications.  Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Credit relationships and firm profitability
2.1 The price of capital
Bank-firm relationships may affect firm profitability through the price of capital.  In von
Thadden (1992) multiple bank relationships abate the informational lock-in problem, which may
reduce the interest rate charged by the inside banks.  Some evidence broadly supports this
potential correspondence between the number of bank relationships and the interest rate paid by
the firm.  For example, studying an extensive survey of small Italian firms, Angelini, Di Salvo
and Ferri (1998) report a negative effect of the number of credit relationships on the interest rate
charged by the credit granting banks.  Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) document that, between 1977
and 1986, Japanese ‘main’ banks, which typically nurture close and exclusive ties with their
corporate clients, extracted higher interest payments than other banks.  Machauer and Weber
(1999) assert similarly that a lower number of bank relationships and in particular a relationship
with a ‘house’ bank, result in higher interest rates for large German firms.
However, these results have not been replicated for other samples and countries.  For
example, Harhoff and Körting (1998b) find no effect of the number of bank relationships on
interest rates analyzing a survey covering small German firms, while Petersen and Rajan (1994)
find that, for small U.S. firms, multiple bank relationships may even increase lending rates.
Interestingly, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) report that Belgian firms taking loans from a
second bank pay higher rates on these loans than the interest rates these firms pay on the loans
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granted by their first bank.
2.2 The availability of capital
Close bank-firm ties may not only increase the firm’s borrowing cost, but may also
affect the availability of capital.  For example, Petersen and Rajan (1995) model the
interdependency between a firm’s possibilities to borrow and the market power of the inside
banks.  They show that borrowing from banks with large market power facilitates inter-temporal
sharing of rent surplus, while competition may hinder such accommodative policies.  Hence an
exclusive bank relationship may facilitate access to capital,1 widen project choice, and boost the
profitability of firms.  Especially those firms most in need of bank financing, such as small and
young firms, may in this way benefit from an exclusive bank relationship.  In contrast
maintaining multiple, non-exclusive bank relationships may result in credit rationing.
Most studies broadly confirm this theoretical intuition.  For example, using data from
the 1987 US survey of small business financing, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that a close
relationship with a singular institutional creditor increases the availability of credit.  Cole (1998)
explores the more recent 1993 small business survey.  He finds that lenders are less likely to
extend credit if borrowers deal with multiple sources of financial services.  Analogously,
Harhoff and Körting (1998b) and Angelini et al. (1998) document that credit availability for
small, German and Italian firms decreases in the number of relationships.  Elsas and Krahnen
(1998) indicate that after a moderate deterioration in the firm’s credit rating, German
‘Hausbanks’, in contrast to other banks, continue to lend to the distressed corporate client.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) also find that Japanese ‘main’ bank clients enjoyed superior access
to capital resources.
While an exclusive bank relationship may positively affect current credit availability, it
also exposes the firm to the risk that future credit needed to reinvest in the project may be
withheld in case the relationship bank is affected by a negative liquidity shock (Detragiache,





Exclusive bank-firm ties not only affect the price and availability of capital, but also
may also directly influence management decisions and firm performance.  For example, Bolton
and Scharfstein (1996) argue that maintaining multiple creditors creates inefficient renegotiation
which may deter strategic default.  While beneficial ex-ante, such a strategy may be costly ex-
post if firm distress is caused by exogenous liquidity shocks.  Hence, all else equal, their model
predicts that low default risk firms will tend to borrow from more creditors.  On the other hand,
and this may be the case especially for large firms, banks may want to diversify firm-specific
credit risk, resulting in more creditors for high default risk firms.  The extant empirical evidence,
though for smaller and medium sized firms, seems to indicate such diversification may play a
role.  For example, Harhoff and Körting (1998a) and Foglia, Laviola and Marullo Reedtz (1998)
find that financially distressed firms (in Germany and Italy respectively) have significantly more
creditors than other, comparable non-distressed firms.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) ascertain that Japanese ‘main’ banks imposed conservative
investment policies on their clients, which inhibited growth and depressed firm profitability.2
Hence their results may indicate a positive relationship between the number of creditors and firm
profitability, if main bank clients in their sample have fewer other credit sources, ceteris paribus.
Gorton and Schmid (1996) study the impact of ‘house’ bank relationships on the performance of
German firms.  Their evidence for 1974 show that to the extent that banks held firms’ equity,
firm performance improved.  'House’ bank relationships are often more exclusive (Machauer and
Weber (1999)), hence this result seems to suggest a negative correspondence between the
number of credit relationships and firm performance.  However, this effect had dissipated by
1985 when securities markets were more developed and banks had reduced their block-
holdings.3
Other papers have touched indirectly upon the connection between the number of
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creditors and firm performance.  For example, Horiuchi (1994) reports that statistical tests do not
reveal any significant differences among Japanese firms having one, two, or three main banks as
regards their profit to asset ratio.4  However, the firms in his sample use many more banks than
the reported ‘main’ banks and no statistical tests are reported concerning the total number of
bank relationships and the profit to asset ratio.  Similarly, Houston and James (1996) find that
the profitability of U.S. publicly listed firms with one versus multiple bank relationships do not
differ significantly.5
2.3.2 Product market behavior
To obtain credit, firms are often compelled to disclose proprietary information to
demonstrate their quality.  Checking account activity may constitute an additional rich source of
‘confidential’ information about a firm’s current condition and future prospects (for example,
Vale (1993) and Nakamura (1993)).  Once acquired and analyzed, a bank could conceivably
transfer such valuable information, directly or through dispensed advice, to product market
competitors of the firm.
However, legal concerns, loss of reputation for the bank, or the negative impact on the
performance of an important client may keep a bank from relaying confidential information
obtained in an exclusive relationship.  For example, in Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)
confidentiality is maintained in bilateral borrowing relationships, and this confidentiality
protects proprietary information and facilitates screening and monitoring.  In their model, this
improved confidentiality encourages investment in research and development, when public
disclosure would create a free-rider problem.
On the other hand, banks may still occasionally, deliberately or accidentally, leak
confidential information.  The legal fallout for the bank of an information spill may be limited,6
banks may try to optimally ‘liquefy reputation’, or they may choose to provide useful
information to an important client.  Hellwig (1991), for example, notes that "the provision of
information and advice to firms has also been an important part of the bank-firm relationship.
Today this aspect may be even more important: if Deutsche bank is involved with the acquisition
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program of Daimler-Benz, the relationship probably has more to do with Daimler-Benz's
demand for information about other firms and industries than with the moral hazard problems in
the relation between Daimler Benz and its financiers...".7
2.3.3 Yosha (1995)
Recent theoretical models focus more closely on the interaction between the number of
creditors and product market competition, with creditors acting as possible conduits of
confidential information.  In Yosha (1995), an innovator is entering an imperfectly competitive
product market with one established competitor.  There is asymmetric information about the
impact of the innovator’s entry on the profits of the established firm.  If the entrant draws a high-
quality project (notice that entrants do not determine the quality of their innovations), the profits
of the established firm will be substantially reduced.  These expected losses will trigger an
aggressive reaction by the established firm, reducing the expected profits of the innovator.  As a
result, the high-quality innovator would like to conceal its type as long as possible.  On the other
hand, if the innovator draws only low-quality projects, the innovator would like to reveal their
type as soon as possible to avoid any unnecessary aggressive response from the established firm.
The number of financing sources determines the degree of revelation of the innovator’s
confidential information concerning project quality.  If the innovator obtains financing from one
source (bilateral financing), less information is leaked to the established competitor than if the
innovator uses multiple sources.  But a multilateral financing arrangement is more costly.  For
example, it is more difficult to communicate with multiple lenders, and there may be a loss of
flexibility for the borrowing firm, as its actions have to be coordinated with more than one
lender.
The low quality innovator will nevertheless utilize multilateral financing to credibly
reveal the low value of its projects to the established firm: the low-quality innovator trades off
the additional cost of communicating with multiple lenders with the gain in profits, resulting
from a more accommodating stance of the established competitor.  In other words, the low-
quality innovator signals his low quality via multiple financing to dampen the aggressive
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response of the incumbent.8  To conclude, in Yosha's model firms using bilateral financing are
more profitable than those using multilateral financing.
2.3.4 von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998)
In an extension of Yosha (1995) by von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998), the monotonic
‘negative’ relationship between ex-post profitability and the number of financing sources is no
longer present and may be reversed.  Their model incorporates two additional features.  First,
multilateral banking does not only entail higher transaction costs, but also more competitive
interest rates.  Second, the innovator can control whether or not to disclose confidential
information during the loan granting process.  In other words, establishing a bank relationship
and disclosing confidential information are independent decisions.
If the innovator discloses information, increasing the number of banks reduces the
innovator’s expected sales profitability, as the probability that information leaks to the
incumbent increases.  If there is no disclosure of confidential information, sales profitability
remains unaffected.  As a result, there is no continuous relationship between sales profitability
and the number of banks.  Sales profitability decreases in the number of banks within the range
of disclosure, and remains high when no disclosure takes place.  Only a highly-rated innovator
will find it optimal not to disclose confidential information, while dealing with multiple banks.
Disclosure would not improve the innovator’s credit standing, and without disclosure there is no
risk of information leakage, while competition between multiple banks lowers the interest rate.
Summarizing, multiple bank relationships go hand-in-hand with lower sales profitability
in Yosha (1995) and in von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998) in case of information disclosure.  A
highly rated innovator will not disclose confidential information such that its high sales
profitability is unaffected.  To obtain a competitive interest rate, this innovator will deal with
many banks.  Ultimately then determining the impact of the number of credit relationships on
firm profitability remains an empirical issue, but as far as we are aware no other paper has tested
this connection directly.
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2.4 Switching credit relationships and the cost of capital
The theoretical intuition and empirical findings discussed so far focus on the static
linkage between the number of credit relationships and the cost and availability of capital.  von
Thadden (1998) models the connection between the switching of credit relationships, firm
quality, and the cost of capital.  von Thadden revisits Sharpe (1990), who analyzes a model in
which a lender obtains inside information about the borrowers’ quality over the course of a
relationship.  The informational asymmetry between the inside bank and the outside banks gives
the existing lender an advantage, leading to uneven ex-post competition.  In particular, in Sharpe
(1990) firms want to borrow for two subsequent periods.  In the first period a firm borrows from
one bank, which in effect becomes the inside bank.  This bank observes after one period the
quality of the firm (good or bad), and can therefore set the interest rate in the second period
contingent on the quality of the firm.  The other ‘outside’ banks observe only a noisy signal
about the firm’s quality.
von Thadden (1998) argues the absence of pure strategy equilibria in Sharpe’s model
due to a ‘winner’s curse’ effect.  In other words, the fact that a bid wins contains information
about the value of the borrower.  In particular, the lower the interest rate offered, the higher is
not only the probability that the bank obtains the client-firm, but also the higher is the
probability that the firm, if obtained, is estimated by other banks to be of a lower value.  von
Thadden computes a mixed equilibrium where firms occasionally switch bank, as in Rajan
(1992).  Both good and bad firms reduce their interest payments, compared to non-switching
good and bad firms respectively, by switching banks.  But bad firms are expected to switch more
frequently.  The latter effect outweighs the decrease in interest rates charged in his model such
that on average switching firms are observed to pay higher interest rates.  Currently no empirical
evidence examines this connection between the switching of credit relationships, interest rates,
and firm profitability.
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3 Data and empirical specification
This paper analyzes data first used by Ongena and Smith (1999).  They study the
duration of bank relationships.  Their data set contains observations of ‘primary’ bank
relationships, gleaned from Kierulf’s Handbook, for virtually all publicly listed, non-financial
Norwegian companies between 1979 and 1995.  The Norwegian setting, and this data set in
particular, is well suited to explore the connection between firm profitability and the character of
the financing arrangement, as modeled by Yosha (1995) and von Rheinbaben and Ruckes
(1998).  First, around 90% of all commercial debt of Norwegian firms is financed by either a
bank or a non-bank financial intermediary (see for example Statistical Yearbook of Norway,
1996), and the banking sector remained highly concentrated throughout the sample period.9
Hence, informational transfers will most likely occur through bank relationships, and stock
prices may not be as informative (Perotti and von Thadden (1998)).  Bank relationships are
reported yearly and only reported bank relationships typically involve both short- and long term
credit.10  In addition, the effect of switching a relationship on interest payments and firm
profitability can be gleaned adequately from accounting statements, as bank debt is particularly
important.
Second, in any given year between 65 and 75% of the publicly listed Norwegian firms
report bilateral, i.e. single, ‘primary’ bank relationships, in sharp contrast with most other
European countries, where bilateral relationships between medium- and large-sized firms and
banks are often the exception (Ongena and Smith (2000)).  Hence, the distinction between
bilateral and multilateral financing will be sharp, and adding or ending a bank relationship will
substantially affect the average firm in the sample.  Also note that to test implications of the von
Thadden (1998) model empirically, we need to observe ‘bilateral’ switches, i.e. replacements of
one single bank relationship for another.
Third, all firms in the data set are publicly listed, but many firms are quite small.  For
example, more than 50% of the firms have less than 500 employees.11  Fourth, casual
observation seems to suggest that many Norwegian product markets are imperfectly competitive.
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And finally, the long time series of bank relationships allows for various stability tests of the
structural relationship, and for more dynamic tests of the basic model.
Each year on average 110 firms, listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, register up to a
maximum of four ‘primary’ bank relationships.  Listing and delisting activity throughout the
sample period results in a total of 235 different firms in the sample.  The average firm reports at
least one bank relationship during 8 consecutive years, amounting to 1897 firm – year
observations (Table 1).
The median firm in the sample uses only one ‘primary’ bank, but around a quarter of the
firms maintain multiple bank relationships (17% of the firms employ two banks, 7% three, and
2% of the firms report the maximum of four banks).12  This presence of firms with multiple bank
relationships results in 2436 relationship – year observations, which is around 30% higher than
the number of firm - years.  Matching each relationship – year with firm specific accounting
information from the computer readable data base FINLIS (accounting data is missing for a few
firms and in the beginning of the sample period) and removing observations with extreme
negative levels of sales profitability leaves 1659 usable relationship – year observations.13  Table
2 lists selected summary statistics for the remaining 1284 companies.  Firms quite often alter
their set of bank relationships.  After matching, the sample contains a total of 87 ‘events’.  In 30
instances a firm replaces its single bank relationship.  Firms also change (15 cases) or end (24
cases) one of their multiple bank relationships, or start an extra new relationship (18 cases).
Are firms using bilateral financing more profitable than those using multilateral
financing?14  To investigate this conjecture directly,15 we start by simply regressing a measure of
firm profitability on a dummy (dRELATION) equal to one (zero) when a firm maintains
multiple (single) bank relationships.  The measure of firm profitability employed as dependent
variable on the left hand side is gross ROA, i.e. the percentage ratio of earnings before interest
and taxes to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt (see Table 2).
This profitability measure is suited to analyze the empirical implication derived in Yosha (1995)
and von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998), as the reaction of the established firm determines the
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entrant’s earnings derived from sales activities.
The empirical specification further includes measures of firm size, debt structure, age,
asset intangibility, and Tobin’s Q as independent variables.  These variables are not featured in
the previously discussed theoretical models, but possible extensions of these models and related
theoretical and empirical work seems to suggest these variables may belong in the estimated
reduced form.  We first motivate why firm size, debt structure, age, and asset intangibility, and
Tobin’s Q should enter the estimated reduced form.  Firm size is included to control for the
firm’s market power and efficiency.  Ceteris paribus, more market power as well as greater
efficiency may result in higher profitability.  Size is measured by the log of the end-of-year
sales, deflated by the Norwegian CPI (SALES).
The debt structure of a firm may affect firm profitability in the presence of agency
problems (for an overview see Harris and Raviv (1991)).  First, debt may mitigate problems of
over- and under-investment improving firm profitability (e.g. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990)).
Second, debt can be used to signal firm profitability (Ross (1977)).  Third, debt influences
strategic interaction among competitors and the interaction with customers and/or suppliers.  In
particular, in Brander and Lewis (1986), firms commit to using a more aggressive product
market strategy by choosing positive debt levels.16  Titman (1984) shows that firms producing
products that are not unique may be expected to have more debt as a commitment device, such
that shareholders will be reluctant to liquidate the firm.  In sum, more debt may result in lower
agency costs, may signal higher profitability, and may increase product market aggressiveness.
The debt structure of the firm is gauged as the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the
market value of equity plus the book value of debt (DEBT).
Finally, firm age captures the length of the track record of the firm and asset
intangibility proxies for firm opaqueness.  Higher communication costs will result in lower
profitability, all else equal.  Firm age is measured by the log of the age of the firm relative to its
founding date (AGE).  As a measure of asset intangibility, we use the ratio of the total book
value of intangibles to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt
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(INTANGIBLES).  Finally, Tobin’s Q stands in for the firm’s investment opportunities, and is
defined as the ratio of the end-of-year market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by
the book value of assets (Q).
4 Results
We first present the results for parsimonious specifications where the analysis focuses
on the direct impact of bilateral versus multilateral financing on firm profitability.  We next
introduce instrumental variables and turn to an ‘event specification’ approach where we discuss
in general the impact upon firm profitability of substituting bank relationship(s).  Further, we
discuss robustness tests and selection issues.  Finally, we investigate the profitability of firms
replacing a single bank relationship.
4.1 Static specification
We start by estimating the base specification discussed so far, containing ROA as the
dependent variable, and a constant, SALES, DEBT, AGE, INTANGIBLES, and Q on the right
hand side.  The first column in Table 3 (Model 3.1) reports the results from OLS estimation.
The coefficient on dRELATION is negative and significant at a 1% level, hence firms with
bilateral financing arrangements are more profitable.  Maintaining multiple bank relationships
decreases ROA by an economically significant 4%, which amounts to more than 40% of its
standard deviation.  Therefore the banking arrangement seems important in explaining firm
profitability.  The coefficient on DEBT is negative and significant at a 1% level, possibly
indicating pecking order behavior, or more product market aggressiveness.  The coefficient on
SALES is significantly positive, because market power and efficiency may result in higher sales
profitability.  The coefficients of AGE and INTANGIBLES are both positive and significant.
The coefficient of Q is not significant.
Model 3.1 implicitly assumes that each firm chooses its size, debt structure, age, asset
intangibility, Q, financial arrangement and corresponding profitability every year, independent
of its own choices in previous years and independent of the contemporaneous choices made by
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all other firms.  This assumption is in sync with the one-shot and single market character of the
game-theoretic models outlined in Yosha (1995) and von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998), but
this assumption is not satisfied in the data for age, nor probably for any of the other firm-
specific variables.17  Hence it seems fruitful to relax this assumption.
We start by introducing a set of industry dummies in the base model to control for
contemporaneous choices made by competitors.  A ‘SIC / NAISC’ type classification scheme is
unfortunately not available in Norway.  Hence we resort alternatively to a broad classification
scheme maintained throughout the sample years by the Oslo Stock Exchange, and to a more
precise classification scheme employed in Finansavisen, a business daily, for which we draw
upon the 1995 edition.18  In these two new unreported specifications, we can reject the joint
hypothesis that all industry dummy coefficients are equal to zero.19  But the coefficients on all
other variables, including dRELATION, are virtually unaffected (though AGE is no longer
significant in the second specification).
Rather than retaining industry dummies in the specification, we next allow for firm- and
calendar year- random effects, which may capture much more generally industry- and economy-
wide influences.  A not reported specification contains in addition to the constant and the six
independent variables, firm- and calendar year- specific errors.20  The results are again virtually
unaltered vis-a-vis the earlier specifications.  The Hausman (1978) test suggests that the null
hypothesis of no correlation between the random effects and the regressors can be rejected at a
1% level.  In addition, given the comprehensiveness of the sample, i.e. virtually all firms listed
on the Oslo Stock Exchange are represented, “the model might be viewed as applying only to the
cross-sectional units in the study, not to additional ones outside the sample” (Greene (1997), p.
623).  Hence a fixed effect specification, reported as Model 3.2, may be more appropriate.21  The
inclusion of 175 firm- and 14 calendar year- specific dummies increases the adjusted R2 and the
absolute magnitudes of all coefficients, except for the coefficients for dRELATION and AGE
which decrease somewhat (the latter is no longer significant).  But the coefficient on
dRELATION remains negative, statistically significant at a 1% level, and economically relevant.
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Next we check the structural stability of the base specification for each consecutive year.
The rationale for this additional step is that the Norwegian financial landscape altered
dramatically during the sample period.  Before deregulation in the mid-80s, chronic excess
demand for credit cemented close and long-term relationships between borrowers and their
banks (Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995)).  Deregulation led to credit expansion, feverish
competition for market share, loan losses, a financial crisis, and eventually the effective
nationalization of the entire banking sector in 1991.22
In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1997), we estimate
year-by-year cross-sectional regression models.  Then we calculate averages and standard
deviations and report the results in Model 3.3 (we report standard deviations divided by the
square root of the number of observations for easier comparison with the standard errors
reported in the other columns).  The average coefficients of these 15 separate regressions and
their significance levels (using standard Z-tests) are very similar to the results reported in the
previous two specifications.  Leverage is correlated negatively with firm profitability, while size,
intangibility of assets, and maintaining a single bank relationships is positively correlated with
firm profitability.
The 15 coefficients on dRELATION seem relatively stable, i.e. all are negative and
many are significant.23  Nevertheless there is an interesting decrease in the coefficient over time
from around –3% to about –6%.  Increased concentration in the banking market may be a
potential explanation.  Such increased concentration could strengthen the impact of the number
of credit relationships on profitability.  Adding a second bank relationship in a concentrated
banking market may increase the possibilities for an information transfer more than in an
unconcentrated banking market.  The correlation between the 15 coefficients and a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for the banking market is indeed high, i.e. –0.77.  Nevertheless, given the
small number of observations we find these results merely suggestive.
Finally, we turn to a specification closer in spirit to the intuition embedded in von
Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998).  In their model, firms with an ex-ante high credit rating will not
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disclose confidential information, but will maintain many bank relationships.  We attempt to
capture this possible non-monotonicity in the relationship between profitability and the number
of bank connections by replacing dRELATION with three dummies in Model 3.2.  These three
new dummies are equal to one when a firm maintains respectively either two, three, or four bank
relationships, and are equal to zero if a firm maintains a single bank relationship.24  Interestingly
the three new coefficients are all significant at a 1% level and increasing in absolute size, i.e. -
2.87, -6.76, and -6.85.  Equality of the first and second coefficient can be rejected at a 1% level
using an F-test, while equality between the second and third coefficient cannot be rejected.  The
impact of the number of bank relationships on firm profitability seems monotonically
decreasing, and does not correspond to the non-monotonic impact conjectured by von
Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998).
4.2 Event specification and two stage least squares
To this point the empirical work in this paper assumed that firm profitability would be
affected immediately by the firm’s choice with respect to the number of bank relationships and
that the latter choice is independent of the firm’s profitability.  We will now address both issues
by extending our empirical model with event dummies and instrumental variables.
4.2.1 Event dummies
In Yosha (1995), established firms adjust their product strategy at once after they
received the signal from the innovator about the financing arrangement.  But the established
competitors may face per period quantity adjustment costs.  If these costs are convex in quantity,
established firms may want to spread their quantity adjustment over time.  In this sense, looking
at the impact of changes in the number of bank relationships on firm profitability may provide
an additional though weaker test of the connection between the number of creditors and firm
profitability.  We will look at the impact of the adjustments in the financial arrangement up to
two years after the event.  This time window seems a-priori reasonable and is commonly found
in other firm performance type studies (for example, Ber, Yafeh and Yosha (1998)).
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Nevertheless we will also report robustness tests with respect to this particular choice.
We start by defining a dummy variable dSTART (dEND) to take the value of one in the
year or up to two years after a firm starts (ends) one of multiple bank relationships.  In most
cases, starting a new relationship involves moving from a bilateral to a multilateral banking
arrangement, while ending a bank relationship results in a move in the opposite direction.  A
dummy variable dSINGLE takes the value of one in the year or up to two years after a firm
replaces a single bank relationship.  The dummy variable dREPLACE takes the value of one in
the year or up to two years after a firm replaces one of multiple bank relationships.25
Replacing a bank could also be a signal about the firm’s quality.  Changing banks will
increase the number of established competitors which can receive information about the
innovator’s quality, as both the corporate customers from the former and the new bank will have
access to the quality information.  This is obviously only the case if the quality of innovators is
constant over a longer time period, in which case information possessed by the former bank
remains accurate.  Low quality innovators may be expected to replace banks more often, even if
replacing banks is costly.  On the other hand, if the quality of innovators changes frequently, and
hence information about their quality is quickly outdated, innovators may still wish to replace
their bank, as banks have different market shares.  A low quality innovator will initially seek a
bank with many other corporate customers, including established competitors, even if this bank
charges more for its services.  Innovators increasing in quality may eventually want to switch to
a bank with fewer customers and possibly lower service charges.
But a bilateral replacement may also indicate coordination among incumbant and entrant
in order to avoid or propagate leakage of information.  For example, a high quality innovator
may wish to switch banks if a major incumbent competitor starts a relationship with the
innovator’s house bank.  An additional wrinkle is that the quality of the signal itself may depend
on the quality of the bank.  High quality banks may be more professional in their management of
inside knowledge and less likely to divulge confidential information to the innovator’s




The assumption of independence between the error term and the explanatory variables
may be violated.  First, even though none of the previously discussed models incorporate this
possibility, the firm’s choice of the number of bank relationships may also depend upon its sales
profitability.  For example, a low-rated firm may have to draw upon multiple banks, whose
willingness to lend is inhibited, but who may be willing to risk small stakes.  Second, while
public observation of the firm’s number of bank relationships may reasonably be expected to
precede the reporting and publication in Kierulfs handbook, it is possible that this is not the case
for all firms.  Notice that reporting to Kierulfs occurs before the annual reports are released by
the firms and publication of Kierulfs occurs after the release.  In addition, profitability figures
refer to the whole calendar year, while the observation of (a change in) the number of bank
relationships and the incumbent’s reaction will occur at some point during the ‘recording year’
employed by Kierulfs.
Hence we also estimate the regression model using two-stage least squares.  We add two
instrumental variables.  BANKSIZE is defined as the maximum market share of any of the
banks the firm has a relationship with,26 and dDnBorCBK, takes the value of one if the firm has
a relationship with either DnB (Bergens Bank or DnC before their merger) or CBK, and zero
otherwise.  We find justification for employing the first variable in the idea that firms having a
relationship with a larger bank don’t need additional banks to satisfy larger credit needs.  The
second variable is complementary.  DnB and CBK are Norway’s two largest banks, offering
specialized credit and foreign exchange products no other domestic bank offers.  In addition,
these banks could be considered less subject to liquidity shocks (Detragiache et al. (1999)) or are
even ‘too-big-to-fail’.
4.2.3 Results
Incorporating the set of new event dummies and two instrumental variables, yields the
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Model 3.4 reports the estimation results for the first equation of this two-equation
model.  The results are interesting.  The coefficients -- their sign, magnitudes, and significance --
on all variables featured in previous models are broadly unaltered, with the exception of
INTANGIBLES.  The coefficient on dRELATION remains negative, around –4%, and
significant at a 1% level.  The coefficient on both dSINGLE and dREPLACE are negative and
significant, indicating that switching a bank relationship is negatively related to the innovator’s
profitability, at least in the reported specification.  If we limit the time window around the four
different types of events to the event year and the following year, the negative coefficient on
dSINGLE becomes insignificant, while the coefficient on dREPLACE remains significant but
only at a 10% level.  Looking only at the event year, leaves neither event dummy coefficient
significant.  But the coefficient on dRELATION remains negative, in these unreported
specifications, significant at the 1% level, and around –3.5%, while other results are broadly
unaltered.
4.3 Robustness
Next we subject the estimated results in Model 3.4 to a battery of robustness checks.
We start by deriving estimates for specifications using alternative measures of firm profitability.
We employ the ratio of 'pre-tax income' (i.e., earnings, ‘before interest and taxes’, minus total
interest expenses) to sales, and the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales.  Interest
expenses may proxy for the fixed cost involved in establishing a bank relationship, featured for
example in Yosha (1995).  And sales profitability is attractive as a measure of firm profitability,
since the theoretical models discussed so far are grounded in product market behaviour.  On the
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other hand, this measure is somewhat less commonly used and by construction prone to more
variability and the occurrence of outliers.  However, the results are mainly unaffected by these
changes in profitability measure, hence are not reported in the table.27  The coefficient on
dRELATION is –4.93 in the first, and –2.76 in the second specification, and significant at a 1
and 10% level respectively.  To control better for dynamics we next add lagged sales
profitability as an exogeneous variable to the latter specification.  This added variable is positive
and significant (though very small), while the coefficient on dRELATION becomes equal to –
3.36 and significant at a 5% level.  The coefficient on dSINGLE remains negative and becomes
quite large in absolute value, and the coefficient dSTART becomes significantly positive.
However neither of these coefficients are robust to alterations in the event window.
We also add ownership concentration, i.e. the proportion of firm equity owned by the
ten largest shareholders, to specification 3.4, as more concentrated ownership may improve sales
profitability (for example, Ber et al. (1998)).  Data on ownership concentration is missing for
some firms in the sample, and only 1120 observations remain.  The coefficient on ownership
concentration, while positive, is not significant.  Other results are broadly unaffected.  Next we
check our empirical model by using alternative definitions of firm size, as we are concerned that
non-linearities or the variable definition could partly determine the results reported so far.
Hence in Model 3.4 we replace SALES alternately with deflated sales and deflated sales
squared, with dummies capturing below and above median deflated sales, with the number of
employees, and with deflated firm assets.  Results are virtually unaffected.
“The central role played in the model by the cost of communicating information renders
the model relevant for firms that are not too small to consider multilateral financing
arrangements, but are not so large that disclosure costs are a trivial consideration.  The model is
therefore most relevant for small- and medium- size firms (say up to 500 workers), ..., which are
innovators in the growth sense (striving to expand into geographical areas or to increase market
share)” (Yosha (1995), p.4).  In addition, notice that neither Yosha (1995) nor von Rheinbaben
and Ruckes (1998) model information transfers from incumbent to innovator or the ensuing
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strategic choice by the incumbent of the optimal number of creditors.  Our empirical exercises
reported so far lump incumbents and innovators together, but firm size is potentially a useful
separation criterion between the two groups of firms.  Hence, to further test the robustness of the
model to firm size and Q, observations for firms larger than 500 employees and firms with a
Tobin’s Q smaller than one are removed from the sample (Model 3.5).  In that way, we hope to
capture the entrant innovators.  We are left with 680 observations.  The coefficient on DEBT is
not significant, while the coefficient on AGE is negative and marginally significant.
Interestingly, the coefficient on dRELATION is quite large, -6.9% or around 80% of the
standard deviation of ROA, and significant at a 1% level.  Equality of this coefficient to the
coefficient on dRELATION of model 3.4 can be rejected at a 5% level using a χ2-test.  The
coefficient on dSINGLE is significantly negative, and more than double the size of the
coefficient on dRELATION, while the coefficient on dREPLACE is not significant.  The
coefficient on dEND is negative and significant.  But these event effects are no longer
significant when we reduce the event window.
Finally, analyzing relationship – year observations and events affecting these
relationships increases the representation in the sample of firms with multiple relationships
and/or subject to many events.  In addition, events could be correlated through time.  For
example, once a firm replaced a bank the probability that another replacement will occur soon
after may increase.  To tackle both problems a not reported exercise considers only one
relationship per firm, either the first relationship affected by an event or the relationship ranked
first (by the firm) in case none were affected.  While the sample drops to 1009 observations,
results are largely unaffected.
To conclude, firms with multiple bank relationships are less profitable.  The difference
with single bank firms in gross return on assets is around 3 to 4%.  The profitability of small
growth firms seems affected even more.  In addition, switching a bank relationship is followed
within 2 years by a significant and substantial decrease in sales profitability.  But the latter result
is not entirely robust to model and sample alterations.  Nevertheless, the results seem broadly in
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line with an ad-hoc dynamic extension of the Yosha (1995) model.
4.4 Single bank replacements
Table 4 takes a closer look at the characteristics of firms replacing a single bank
relationship in the event year vis-à-vis the characteristics of all other single bank firms across
their listing period.28  We observe 30 switches of single bank relationships in the sample.  As
reported in the table, switching firms are on average smaller and younger in the switching year
than other single bank firms across their listing period.  They also seem less profitable, but the
difference is not significant at standard significance levels.  Hence ‘bad’ firms seem to switch
more often on average than ‘good’ ones, broadly confirming one implication of von Thadden
(1998).  Table 4 also compares firms with bilateral and multiple bank relationships (i.e. we add
column 1 and 2, and compare it to column 3).  Firms with multiple bank relationships are less
profitable, are larger, have a higher debt and intangibility ratio, and a lower Tobin's Q.  These
results broadly correspond to Houston and James (1996).
5 Conclusion
Our empirical work suggests that the profitability of Norwegian publicly listed firms
with bilateral bank relationships is higher than the profitability of firms with multilateral
relationships.  This result is quite robust.  It holds controlling for firm age, size, debt, asset
intangibility, and Tobin’s Q and in a variety of specifications.  The result seems conform an
implication of Yosha (1995) and von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998).  If firms disclose
proprietary information to creditors, firms using bilateral financing achieve higher sales
profitability than those using multilateral financing.
The effects of the replacement, start, or end of one of multiple relationships are less
clear.  Replacing a bilateral or one of multiple relationships seems to decrease profitability for
two years following the event.  However, these results are not robust to changes in the length of
the event window or to model alterations, possible because the sample does not contain enough
events.  Switching firms are on average smaller, younger, and seem to be less profitable in the
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switching year than other single bank firms across their listing period.  Hence mainly 'bad' firms
switch.
A life cycle view of firm financing may synthesize the results.  Small, young firms with
promising projects start with a bilateral relationship.  If they grow and continue to have high
quality projects, these firms may remain with the same bank.  If firms grow, but their future
projects are only mediocre, firms may switch or may add more bank relationships to satisfy their
financial needs, while at the same time conveying their lower quality to competitors by
maintaining multiple bank relationships.
Table 1
Full sample characteristics.
Firms report a minimum of one and a maximum of four ‘primary’ bank relationships, which are
listed in Kierulf’s Handbook.  The total number of firms reporting bank relationships is the
number of different firms listing bank relationships in Kierulf’s Handbook between 1979 and
1995.  The total number of firm – years is the number of firms listing a bank relationship times
the number of years the firm is reporting the bank relationship in Kierulf’s Handbook between
1979 and 1995.  The total number of relationship – years is the number of firms listing bank
relationships times the number of years the firm is reporting the bank relationship times the
number of events (or one if no events take place) for that particular firm.  Events include: the
replacement of a single bank relationship, the replacement of one of multiple bank relationships,
the start of an additional bank relationship, and the end of a bank relationship.  The data from
Kierulf’s Handbook is matched with accounting information gleaned from FINLIS, an







Total number of firms reporting bank relationships 235 176
Total number of firm – years 1897 1284
Total number of relationship – years 2436 1659
Total number of events 118 87
Replacement of a single bank relationship 44 30
Replacement of one of multiple bank relationships 16 15
Start of an additional bank relationship 24 18
End of a bank relationship 34 24
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics.
The number of firm – year observations is 1284, except for the ownership concentration ratio where it is 883.  Gross ROA is the percentage ratio of earnings
before interest and taxes to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  Pre-tax income / assets is the percentage ratio of earnings before
taxes to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  EBIT / sales is the percentage ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to end-of-
year sales.  Sales is the end-of-year sales (in 000 Norwegian Kroner, 7.5 Kroner buy approximately 1 US $), deflated by the Norwegian CPI (1979=1).  Assets
is the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt (in 000 Norwegian Kroner), deflated by the Norwegian CPI (1979=1).  The debt ratio is
the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  The age of the firm is measured relative to the
founding date of the firm.  Intangibles is the ratio of the total book value of intangibles to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the end-of-year market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of assets.  The ownership concentration
ratio is the proportion of firm equity owned by the ten largest shareholders.  The multiple-bank relationship dummy takes the value of one when a firm
maintains a multiple-bank relationship and zero otherwise.  A t-test determines the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients (degrees of freedom =








Gross ROA (in %) 3.23 9.50 -57.38 1.44 5.03 7.72 23.1
Pre-tax income / assets (in %) 0.12 10.33 -86.09 -1.85 2.16 4.52 20.42
EBIT / sales (in %) 6.38 21.24 -141.73 1.69 6.00 10.99 85.7
Sales 900,616 2,736,829 4,777 645,380 178,930 6,304,600 29,864,000
Number of employees 1780 4138 1 116 486 1461 43122
Assets 1,189,793 3,513,813 4,782 112,880 262,750 835,130 46,340,000
Debt ratio 0.614 0.223 0 0.453 0.639 0.790 0.997
Age 59 41 0 19 63 86 245
Intangibles 0.017 0.050 0 0 0 0.014 0.605
Tobin’s Q 1.401 1.017 0.385 1.038 1.202 1.504 30.730
Ownership concentration ratio 0.660 0.206 0 0.525 0.674 0.810 1
Multiple-bank relationship dummy 0.290 0.454 0 0 0 1 1
Table 2 / continued
Correlation coefficients (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)




































































































(10) Tobin’s Q 1 -0.034 -0.122
***
(11) Ownership concentration ratio 1 0.018
(12) Multiple-bank relationship dummy 1
*** Significant at 1%,  ** significant at 5%,  * significant at 10%.
Table 3
Static and dynamic specifications.
The Static Sample contains 1284 firm-years, the Dynamic Sample contains 1659 relationship-
years.  The Restricted Sample contains only relationship-years for small and growth-oriented
firms (i.e. firms with fewer than 500 employees and Tobin’s Q larger than 1).  The dependent
variable is the percentage ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the sum of the market
value of equity plus the book value of debt (gross ROA).  SALES is the log of the end-of-year
sales (in 000 Norwegian Kroner), deflated by 100 times the Norwegian CPI (1979=1).  DEBT is
the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value
of debt.  AGE is the log of the age of the firm and is measured relative to the founding date of
the firm.  INTANGIBLES is the ratio of the total book value of intangibles to the sum of the
market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  Q is the ratio of the year-end market value
of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of assets.  dRELATION takes the
value of one when a firm maintains a multiple-bank relationship and zero otherwise.  dSINGLE
takes the value of one in the year or up to two years after a firm replaces a single bank
relationship and zero otherwise.  dREPLACE (dSTART, dEND) takes the value of one in the
year or up to two years after a firm replaces (starts, ends) one of multiple bank relationships and
zero otherwise.  Coefficients are listed on the first row in each cell with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors below in parentheses (for model 3 we list the sample standard
deviations divided by the square root of the number of observations).
Table 3 / continued
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Static Static Fama-French Dynamic Restricted
Number of Obs. 1284 1284 14 1659 680
Estimation OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS























































































Adjusted R2 0.119 0.544 0.151 0.500 0.289
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 4
Replacement of single bank relationships.
The first column lists the characteristics of firms replacing a single bank relationship in the event
year.  The second column reports characteristics of all other firms, which across their listing
period, have only one bank relationship and do not replace that relationship.  The last column
lists characteristics of firms which report multiple bank relationships.  Gross ROA is the
percentage ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the sum of the market value of equity
plus the book value of debt.  Pre-tax income / assets is the percentage ratio of earnings before
taxes to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  EBIT / sales is the
percentage ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to end-of-year sales.  Sales is the end-of-
year sales (in 000 Norwegian Kroner), deflated by the Norwegian CPI (1979=1).  Assets is the
sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt (in 000 Norwegian Kroner),
deflated by the Norwegian CPI (1979=1).  The debt ratio is the ratio of the book value of debt to
the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  The age of the firm is
measured relative to the founding date of the firm.  Intangibles is the ratio of the total book value
of intangibles to the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Tobin's Q is
the ratio of the year-end market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book
value of assets.  Means are listed on the first row in each cell, standard errors are reported below
in parentheses, and medians are listed on the third row.  The means are compared using a two-
sided T-test (variances are not assumed equal).  To compare medians we use a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test.







Number of observations 30 538 574



































































































***, **, * Significantly different from ‘Not Replacing’ at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
∗∗∗, ∗∗,  ∗ Significantly different from ‘Bilateral’ (Column 1 and 2) at 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively.
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Notes
1 Access to non-bank funding may be improved by a close bank relationship (Diamond (1991)),
in effect reducing the need for bank funds (Miarka (1999)).
2 Kang, Shivdasani and Yamada (1999) on the other hand find that close ties with healthy
Japanese banks facilitated investment policies enhancing shareholder wealth, especially for firms
with poor investment opportunities.
3 However, the focus of these and related studies (e.g., Cable (1985) and Edwards and Fisher
(1994)) is mainly on the universal character of the German banking system, and not on the
number of different banks a firm engages.  See for example Emmons and Schmid (1998) for a
review of this literature.
4 Most firms in his data set have more than one ‘main’ bank, in contrast to firms in Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998) which predominantly have single ‘main’ bank relationships.
5 Houston and James (1996) focus on the reliance on bank debt, which they find negatively
related to the importance of growth opportunities for firms with a single bank relationship, and
positively related for firms borrowing from multiple banks.
6 Seeking legal redress for such an information spill by a bank may be difficult.  It is hard to
document that the information transfer actually took place.  Moreover, it is not clear that courts
will be sympathetic to the plaintiff's case.  For example, in ADT Operations, Inc. versus Chase
Manhattan Bank (Chase financed a hostile takeover by another client against ADT) the court
dismissed the charges of abuse of confidential information.  The court noted that “no fiduciary
relationship has been created by the mere communication of confidential information from the
customer to the bank”.  This case is discussed at length in von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998).
7 German banks are often suspected of shepherding domestic firms through their holdings of
voting rights and board membership and through their resulting informational leverage.  For
example, on March 18th, 1997 Krupp launched a hostile takeover bid for Thyssen, and Deutsche
Bank and Dresdner Bank were important holders of voting rights at Thyssen.  To back the
hostile takeover bid both "Deutsche Morgan Grenfell and Dresdner Kleinwort Bentwort,
provided, through their parent commercial banks, a credit line believed to be worth DM18
billion" (The Economist, March 22, 1997).  Deutsche was criticised because one of its board
members was also a member of the Thyssen supervisory board.  "He sat alongside the Thyssen
management at the company's annual meeting last Friday without giving a hint of the bid plans
or the bank's role" (Financial Times, March 21, 1997)).  "The deal faltered mainly because
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank ... got cold feet" (The Economist, March 29, 1997).
8 In fact, this dampening strategic effect causes higher firm quality to improve profitability by
relatively more when firms are bilaterally financed.  The reason is that in case firms are
multilaterally financed, information leakage neutralizes part of the impact of the quality
differential.
9 For example a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated as the sum of the squared percentage
shares of the total number of relationships with publicly listed firms held by each bank, stood at
3258 in 1989, and 2984 in 1994.
10 In a recent survey of 16 randomly chosen firms, all reported ‘primary’ bank relationships
involve short and long term credit, cash management, foreign exchange and hedging services.
Eleven firms also employ other banks for a variety of services but typically at a much lower
intensity.  Only 6 firms obtain credit from their ‘non-primary’ banks.
11 Yosha (1995) suggests this cut-off rate for applicability of his theoretical model.
12 This also shows that the maximum of ‘four’ primary bank relationships is not an important
restriction.
13 We remove 14 observations for which the percentage ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes to end-of-year sales is less than -150%, and 2 observations with negative sales values.
Firms with extreme negative levels of profitability are likely to be atypical and the removal of
extreme observations may facilitate the interpretation of the results.
14 In Yosha (1995) higher firm quality improves profitability relatively more if firms are
bilaterally financed than if firms are multilaterally financed.  In the latter case information
leakage neutralizes part of the impact of the quality differential.  Interactive variables would be
needed to estimate this additional effect.
15 Explaining firm profitability has been and remains a topic of great controversy in Industrial
Organization (IO).  Firm profitability could reflect both market power and greater efficiency
(Demsetz (1974)).  New Empirical IO suggests to study the profitability of industries and firms
separately, that is taking into account strategic interaction among firms (see e.g. Bresnahan
(1997) for a good overview).  Theoretical models, such as Yosha (1995), von Rheinbaben and
Ruckes (1998), and von Thadden (1998), are based upon imperfect information and the
requirement that behavior should occur as an equilibrium phenomenon.  This is fully in line with
the tenets of the New Empirical IO approach.  However, we are deviating from the New
Empirical IO ground rules when we consider all Norwegian firms simultaneously (the
theoretical models apply to all industries), and when we use accounting data as a proxy for firm
profitability.  But in our empirical specification we will also analyze specifications containing
fixed firm effects.  Moreover, our focus is not on the measurement of market power or greater
efficiency but on the effect of bilateral/multilateral financing mechanisms and bank switching
upon firm profitability.
16 On the other hand, in Hubert (1998) equity enhances the firm's competitiveness in the product
market.
17 Recall also the discussion concerning the application of the New Empirical IO.
18 The OSE scheme categorizes publicly listed firms in four groups: industry, shipping,
insurance, and banking (the latter two categories are irrelevant for our purposes).  There are also
a few unclassified firms.  The industry classification scheme employed by Finansavisen assigns
firms to eight different business categories: manufacturing, media, off-shore (i.e. mainly oil- and
gas-related activities), shipping, other transportation, IT, real estate, and distribution.  Our
assignment of firms to categories on the basis of their 1995 classification is problematic for
firms not listed in 1995, for firms which shifted industry during the sample years, and for firms
operating in more than one industry.
19 We use a Wald χ2 test.  For the first specification the test statistic is equal to 8.01, for the
second it is equal to 14.16.  Hence the hypotheses can be rejected at a 5% and 10% level of
significance respectively.
20 See Greene (1997) for a discussion on why it is reasonable to start with a random effects
model (p. 632).
21 Likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the independent
variables, firm, and year dummies are all (i.e., within each group) equal to zero at a significance
level of 1% and for a variety of sub-specifications.  (1) Constant term only, (2) Constant term
and firm effects, (3) Constant term and X - variables, (4) Constant term, X and firm effects, (5)
Constant term, X, firm, and year effects.  Likelihood ratio tests are then conducted on the
following pairings: (2) vs (1), (3) vs (1), (4) vs (1), (4) vs (2), (4) vs (3), (5) vs (4), and (5) vs
(3).  F-tests confirm these results.  In addition most individual coefficients on the fixed year
effects are significant.  Both set of tests seem to suggest that even after controlling for firm
characteristics, such as age, size, debt structure, asset intangibility, and the type of banking
arrangement, both firm- and year- specific effects are present in the data.
22 For an overview of the events in the run-up to and during the Norwegian banking crisis, see
for example Kaen and Michalsen (1997).
23 Four coefficients are significant at 5% and three at a 10% level.  The signficance level on six
other coefficients is below 20%.
24 236 firms report two, 101 firms report three, and 38 firms report four bank relationships.
25 We consider a change in relationship due to a bank merger not to be an event.
26 Market share is based on the total number of bank relationships a bank has with OSE listed
firms.
27 Using net income to equity (Return On Equity) changes the results.  All coefficients on the
variables become insignificant, except for DEBT.  But ROE is often noisy and driven by
accounting and tax practises.
28 We actually discard the first year in each listing period, as it is impossible to know whether or
not switching occurred.
